How Russia could benefit from the US-Israeli war on Iran | Russia-Ukraine war
Moscow Responds to U.S.-Israeli Actions in Iran
Recent U.S.-Israeli military actions against Iran, including the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have raised concerns in Moscow. Some Russian commentators warn that Russia could be at risk of similar aggression, despite its extensive nuclear arsenal. They point to bold statements from Western officials regarding potential conflict with Russia as evidence of an underlying intent.
While the attack on Iran has alarmed officials in the Kremlin, it is also viewed as a validation of Russia’s own foreign policy, particularly its military actions in Ukraine. This perspective aligns with the long-standing Russian belief that the U.S.-led West acts as a rogue and unpredictable force on the global stage.
For President Vladimir Putin, recent developments in Iran evoke memories of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, which significantly shaped his threat perception. The ousting of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi that year followed a military operation approved by then-President Dmitry Medvedev, who allowed Russia to abstain from a United Nations Security Council vote.
In October 2011, just as Putin was preparing to return to the presidency, Gaddafi was killed by rebels. While Western leaders celebrated the end of his regime, Libya subsequently descended into civil war and instability. This outcome reinforced Putin’s view of the consequences of Western intervention and fueled his suspicion of the West’s push for “democratization.”
Following the NATO actions, Putin faced domestic unrest in Russia, with large protests against electoral fraud in late 2011. In response, he clamped down on dissent before his May 2012 inauguration, a move that marked a significant shift in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy and foreshadowed its response to Ukraine’s political upheaval less than two years later.
As he observes the unfolding events in Iran, Putin may see a confirmation of his rationale for military action in Ukraine. He appreciates the Soviet Union’s legacy of a substantial nuclear arsenal as integral to Russia’s sovereignty and the stability of his leadership.
Despite initiating aggression against Ukraine, Putin portrays himself as a defender of a post-World War II order, which he believes is threatened by an overreaching and arrogant West.
The notion of taking the war to enemy territory can be traced back to 1930s Soviet military doctrine. Ukraine and Georgia were deemed adversaries after NATO offered a pathway to membership in 2007. The doctrine gained momentum during the brief conflict in Georgia in 2008 and was later applied to the conflicts in Ukraine, beginning with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and escalating with the invasion in 2022. The Kremlin positions Ukraine as a battleground in its broader conflict with the West, largely insulating the Russian populace from the war’s direct effects.
Historically, Russia and Iran have maintained tense relations, yet the two nations have found common cause in the current conflict. Iran has supplied crucial drone technology to Russia amid its extensive invasion of Ukraine. That support, however, has not stemmed from altruism; Tehran has received significant financial backing in return, bolstering its own struggling economy.
Despite these developments, Russia’s ties with Iran do not compel Moscow to intervene directly. An informal non-aggression pact with Israel limits Russia’s options, particularly as Israel refrains from supplying military aid to Ukraine or participating in Western sanctions against Russia. This relationship has also made Israel an appealing refuge for members of the Russian elite with longstanding connections to the country.
Observers note that former U.S. President Donald Trump’s attempts to broker peace in the Russia-Ukraine conflict influence Moscow’s current stance. Russia appears cautious not to jeopardize its relationship with the Trump administration, which could prolong the war.
While Russia might wish to support Iran, it faces constraints in its capacity to do so. Any military technology assistance could risk its relations with both Israel and the U.S., especially if Iran lacks the financial resources to pay for such aid.
In the short term, the U.S.-Israeli operations against Iran may inadvertently benefit Russia. Increased conflict in the Middle East has already elevated global oil and gas prices, ensuring higher revenues for the Russian state. Elevated energy prices could hinder the European Union’s ability to finance Ukraine’s war effort.
Furthermore, a prolonged conflict in the Middle East would likely deplete U.S. military stocks, diminishing support available to Ukraine, particularly in terms of critical air defense systems. This situation might grant Moscow greater leverage in ongoing negotiations with Ukraine.
Domestically, Putin may also gain from the turmoil in Iran. Scenes of destruction and conflict can strengthen his image as a defender of the nation, regardless of the authoritarian methods employed in his leadership.
As the situation evolves, the implications for Russia’s foreign policy and its approach to both Ukraine and Iran will continue to unfold.
