Syria’s restrained approach to Israel carries risks | Opinions
Israeli Attacks on Syrian Territory Continue Amid Diplomatic Efforts
Damascus, Syria — In a renewed wave of hostility, Israeli forces targeted Syrian territory last week, shelling a hilltop near Beit Jinn in the western outskirts of Damascus and conducting a raid in a village within Quneitra province.
These actions follow recent Israeli airstrikes on the Abu al-Duhur military base in northern Syria, which caused significant damage. Israel stated that the strikes were aimed at preempting a potential Turkish military presence in the region. Both the Syrian and Turkish governments have disputed this assertion. Israeli military operations have persisted, even as Syria has attempted to engage in diplomatic efforts aimed at de-escalation. This has drawn criticism from U.S. officials regarding the recent Abu al-Duhur strike.
Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, which assumed control following the regime’s prior leadership, continues to call for Israel’s withdrawal from occupied areas while maintaining that Syria should be free to rebuild its military and collaborate with allies of its choosing.
These developments highlight a dual reality for Syria. The recent approaches illustrate a belief among the new leadership that national sovereignty can be reclaimed through strengthening state capabilities. However, this strategy poses risks as Israel may further intrude upon Syrian sovereignty while capitalizing on Syria’s current constraints. Moreover, the Syrian government risks losing trust among its citizens and the broader Arab population, where perceptions of Israel remain predominantly negative.
The current vulnerabilities of Syria are evident. Following the collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad’s administration in late 2024, Israel struck key military assets throughout the country. The newly formed government is now working to rebuild national security structures from weakened institutions and a fractured collection of armed groups.
At present, a significant military response from Syria that could alter Israeli conduct appears unlikely. Rather, al-Sharaa’s administration has prioritized economic recovery and enhancing international legitimacy. Key initiatives have included reinstating essential state functions, restructuring security sectors, restoring energy supplies, improving diplomatic relations, and re-establishing Syria’s connectivity to the global economy.
Reconstruction of Syria’s severely damaged infrastructure is estimated to cost around $216 billion, as per World Bank assessments. A state facing such extensive financial needs cannot restore its authority solely through military means; it requires revenue, reliable electricity, efficient governance, access to banking systems, investment, and healthy international relations.
Recent actions on the international front have shown progress for Damascus. Washington dismantled its extensive sanctions against Syria in 2025, and the European Union has lifted many economic restrictions, although some targeted sanctions remain in place. Additionally, the U.S. removed Syria from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, alleviating another barrier to financial normalization and investment.
For the Syrian government, these developments represent an expansion of available resources for governance, transcending mere economic advantages gained from avoiding conflict. However, this complicates its position regarding Israel, as Syria’s reconstruction efforts increasingly depend on international access that years of isolation have limited.
A potential military escalation could threaten investor confidence, complicate Syria’s reintegration into international finance, and weaken the diplomatic support essential for its recovery. It may also expose Damascus to renewed political pressure from the U.S. and the EU, although this does not necessarily imply the immediate reinstatement of broad sanctions.
Consequently, Syria’s dilemma intensifies: While exercising restraint may help maintain a conducive international environment for rebuilding, it also allows Israel to limit Syria’s military and strategic capabilities.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed concerns about Syria’s new leadership, which has connections to an armed Islamist movement, and has voiced increasing alarm regarding Turkey’s military collaboration with Damascus. Netanyahu’s calls for the demilitarization of Syria’s Quneitra, Deraa, and Suwayda provinces underscore Israel’s broader intentions to restrict Syria’s military revival.
Israel perceives its interventions as preventive security measures, while Damascus views such actions as violations of its sovereignty—a nation unable to dictate the deployment and training of its military lacks full strategic autonomy.
Al-Sharaa’s strategy strives to avoid confrontations in order to rebuild the state’s capacities, even as these capacities come under Israeli pressure. Despite backing from other Arab nations and support from the U.S. and EU for a functional Syrian state as part of regional stability, military actions from Israel remain ongoing.
Public sentiment in Syria poses another risk. An inability to respond effectively to Israeli aggression may undermine al-Sharaa’s public standing and his government’s legitimacy. A 2025 survey by the Arab Center Washington DC revealed that 74% of Syrians opposed recognizing Israel, with 70% rejecting agreements lacking the return of the Golan Heights, and 88% perceiving Israel as a threat to Syria’s security and stability. Yet, 61% of respondents believed the government’s foreign policy aligned with the views of the Syrian populace.
These findings complicate the landscape. While they established political boundaries concerning relations with Israel, they do not indicate a public demand for military action. Similar polling across the Arab world reflects overwhelming opposition to recognizing Israel.
Historically, Syria under the al-Assads avoided direct confrontations with Israel while maintaining ties to regional resistance movements. In contrast, al-Sharaa’s administration appears to be betting on institutional consolidation, economic growth, international integration, and a rebuilt national military.
This strategy does not negate the need for territorial sovereignty; rather, it aims to restore the means to exercise it. However, the viability of this approach hinges on whether enhanced state capacities can eventually afford Syria greater control over its territory, security decisions, and diplomatic relations.
